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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of trade openness on income inequality, and shows how this 
effect is shaped by the presence of conflicts. I argue that income-generating activities controlled 
by the rich expand during conflicts, whereas those controlled by the poor contract. I find that 
trade openness leads to greater income inequality in countries where the risk of conflicts is high. 
Moreover, income inequality is directly affected by conflicts, and is higher in more ethnically 
diverse countries and lower under democratic regimes. The econometric analysis suggests that 
these effects are robust to a wide range of economic and institutional factors. 
 
Keywords: Trade Openness, Conflict Risk, Income Inequality, Institutional Quality, Military in 
Politics. 
 
JEL Classifications: D6, F1, H7, P4. 
                                                          
†
 Department of Economics, University of Ottawa; dolou047@uottawa.ca. I am grateful to Victoria Barham, Yazid 
Dissou, Fernanda Estevan, Marcel Fafchamps, Louis Hotte, Roland Kpodar, Stéphane Pallage, Roland Pongou, 
Marcel-Cristian Voia, Stephan Schott, Raju Singh, the participants of the CSAE Conference at the University of 
Oxford, and the participants of the CEA Conference at the University of Calgary for useful discussions and 
comments. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the effect of trade openness on income inequality and how this effect is 
shaped by the presence of conflict. A large literature exists on the relationship between trade 
openness and income inequality. The first group of studies, in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin 
(HO) prediction, finds a negative relationship between trade openness and income inequality 
(Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Calderon and Chong, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). The 
second group draws the opposite conclusion; namely, that trade openness increases income 
inequality (Barro, 2000; Ravallion, 2001; Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Milanovic and Squire, 
2003). Finally, the third group finds no empirical evidence of any effect of trade openness on 
income inequality (Edwards, 1997; Li et al., 1998). 
In this paper, I contend that this mixed empirical evidence likely arises because prior 
studies have ignored the existence of conflicts, which may affect the environment in which 
countries are called upon to open their economies. I argue that an accurate assessment of the 
effect of greater trade openness on income inequality must account for the conflict risk occurring 
in developing countries, and suggest two mechanisms by which conflict risk may mediate the 
relationship between trade openness and income inequality. 
First, conflict risk may affect the structure of the economy. According to the literature on 
the political economy of conflict, economic activities can be classified into three main groups: 
war-invulnerable activities, war-vulnerable activities such as construction, transport, distribution, 
finance and manufacturing, and an unclassified group that includes other activities. Thus, during 
conflict, while war-vulnerable activities may contract, war-invulnerable activities can expand 
relative to GDP (Collier, 1999). In war-affected countries, farmers often lose their access to 
markets and the ability to profit from market exchange (Bircan et al., 2010). For example, 
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Deininger (2003) finds that persistent civil conflict in Uganda during the 1990s reduced 
agricultural investments, leading to a shift of economic activities towards subsistence and less 
integration into the market. Furthermore, McKay and Loveridge (2005) exploit national 
representative surveys that provide the sources of income among agricultural households in 
Rwanda. They find that, after the 1994 genocide period, the poorest groups were unable to derive 
benefits from agricultural commercialization because they were pulled out of the markets, 
leading to a decrease in agricultural income for many rural households. They argue that this 
income reduction can be one driver of increasing inequality in rural areas. Second, conflict risk 
may act as a factor that shifts a redistribution of the gains from trade towards connected and 
well-informed people, and then exacerbates income inequality of already poor groups. This 
happens because if fragile countries characterised by higher risk of conflict attempt to increase 
their openness to trade, it may favor a minority of people close to a regime in power by 
concentrating all the gains generated by the trade openness. 
Studying conflict risk and its effects is even more important, since the number of 
countries engaged in conflicts has increased significantly over the past two decades, reaching 
more than 20 percent during the 1990s (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Most of those conflicts 
occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (34) and Asia (33), followed by North Africa and the Middle 
East (17), Latin America (15), Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union (13) (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003). 
I begin by assessing the effects of both trade openness and conflict risk on income 
inequality. I refer to this model as the additive model. I then move on by showing that the effect 
of trade openness may depend on the level of conflict risk. The objective of this process is to 
capture the interaction effect on income inequality after controlling for a wide range of 
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macroeconomic, demographic and institutional variables, and a model to which I refer as the 
interactive model. 
This study departs from the previous papers that proxy civil wars as internal conflicts that 
count for more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Bircan et al., 
2010), and civil conflicts as those counting 25 battle deaths per annum (Blattman and Miguel, 
2010), as I view this approach as too restrictive and likely to underestimate the real effects of 
conflict on income inequality. This issue has been recently raised by Esteban and Ray (2011): 
‘...But social conflict need not manifest itself in civil war alone, and there are various 
other measures (that incorporate, for instance, strikes, demonstrations, riots, 
assassinations, political prisoners, and the like)’, Esteban and Ray (2011, p. 1368). 
Instead, I use two variables - internal and external conflict risk - drawn from the Political 
Risk Services/International Country Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG) database, which captures a wider 
concept of conflict risk. For instance, internal conflict risk, which is an assessment of an armed 
or political violence and civil opposition to the government, includes not only civil war/coup 
threat and terrorism/political violence, but also civil disorder. External conflict risk captures war, 
cross-border conflict, and foreign pressures, including the risk to the incumbent government 
from foreign action through both non-violent external pressure (e.g., diplomatic pressures, trade 
restrictions, sanctions, withholding of aid) and violent external pressure (ranging from cross-
border conflicts to all-out war). Note, however, that internal conflict risk can be local, and may 
not affect all of a country's economic activities. 
I use a sample of 39 developing countries
1
 to empirically examine the effects of trade 
openness, conflict risk and their interaction on income inequality. I start the estimations by 
                                                          
1
 Lundberg and Squire (2003) used a panel of 38 countries to analyse the simultaneous relationship between 
inequality and growth. Spilimbergo et al. (1999) used a panel of 34 countries to find that the effects of trade 
openness on inequality can be influenced by factor endowments, and Ravallion (2001) used a panel of 50 
developing countries to show the correlation between growth, inequality and poverty. 
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applying the biased-corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator (LSDVC), as suggested 
by Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005), to eliminate unobserved individual heterogeneity. It is 
particularly suitable for small samples and appropriate to unbalanced panel data. I deal with the 
endogeneity issues of some explanatory variables such as conflict risk and trade openness by 
using the System-Generalised Method of Moments (Sys-GMM) dynamic panel-data estimation 
technique suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). This technique allows the instrumentation of 
endogenous variables by their lagged values. 
The empirical results suggest the existence of a threshold effect; that is, the impact of 
trade openness on income inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, trade 
openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risks of internal and external 
conflicts are high, but decreases inequality when the risks are low. The results also suggest a 
non-monotonous relationship between income inequality and conflict risk, indicating that 
countries with higher risk of external and internal conflicts are more unequal. Furthermore, I find 
consistently that the coefficient related to the lagged dependent variable is always positive and 
significant. This suggests the presence of high persistence in income inequality. While ethnic 
tensions appear to increase income inequality, democratic regimes are more egalitarian. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out a literature review 
of relevant theoretical and empirical studies. Section 3 presents an econometric strategy by 
describing the data and the methodology employed to test the main hypotheses of the paper, and 
to discuss endogeneity issues. The results are reported in Section 4. In Section 5 the robustness 
of the results is checked by including some additional control variables such as institutional 
quality, ethnic tensions, natural resource abundance, and financial development variables. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Trade Openness and Income Inequality 
 
The traditional model employed by researchers to study the distributional effect of greater 
openness on income inequality is the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model. As reported in Anderson 
(2005), the model predicts that in developing countries, greater openness boosts the demand for 
unskilled relative to skilled labor, which raises the wages of unskilled laborers and their share of 
national income relative to skilled labor. This decreases overall income inequality because 
unskilled labor is more equally distributed than skilled labor. One of the problems is that the 
outcomes of the HO model are based on many restrictive assumptions that are far from the real 
world (Meschi and Vivarelli, 2009). 
A number of papers, departing from some of the main assumptions of the HO model, find 
interesting additional results that contradict or are in conflict with the standard prediction. For 
instance, Leamer (1987) used a 3-n model where there are three factors of production (capital, 
labor and land) and n goods produced by allowing the inclusion of natural resources into the 
model, and showed that greater openness may increase income inequality in developing 
countries that have relatively abundant supplies of those resources. The argument is that greater 
openness will raise the relative returns to natural resources that are less equally distributed than 
other assets. Furthermore, one of the main hypotheses of the HO theory is that all countries have 
equal access to the best available production technology. In Pissarides (1997), this assumption is 
relaxed, and this study finds that greater openness to technology may well increase the relative 
demand for skilled labor, even in developing countries. The reason is that learning and adapting 
to a new technology always requires the use of skilled laborers, whose wages rise. In line with 
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Pissarides (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (1999) find that the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in developing countries increases if globalization is characterised by the 
transfer of production technology from developed to developing countries. 
Other empirical studies on the distributional effect of trade openness find that trade 
openness increases income inequality (Barro, 2000; Lundberg and Squire 2003). Barro (2000) 
studies a relationship between inequality and growth and uses a panel of countries to estimate a 
Kuznets curve. After adding an interaction term between the openness ratio and the per capita 
GDP, Barro finds that the inequality increasing effect of trade openness is most pronounced in 
poor countries. Lundberg and Squire (2003), simultaneously estimating the evolution of growth 
and inequality, find that trade liberalization goes along with higher income inequality. 
However, other empirical papers support the prediction of the HO model by asserting a 
decrease in income inequality after trade openness (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Calderon 
and Chong, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). In a cross-sectional analysis, the empirical findings 
of Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990) suggest that differences in income inequalities within 
developing countries are determined by the endowments in mineral resources, trade protection 
and land concentration in agricultural exports. They obtain a significant and large effect of 
comparative advantages and the foreign trade structure on income inequality. Using a panel of 
countries, Calderon and Chong (2001) find that an increase in the volume of trade leads to a 
long-run decline in income inequality. 
Alternatively, other scholars show that the effects of trade on income inequality are 
contingent upon the level of countries' factor endowments. Spilimbergo et al. (1999) find that the 
link between trade liberalization and income inequality depends on the level of human capital 
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and arable land per capita. They found that trade openness reduces income inequality in capital-
abundant countries, whereas it increases it in skill-abundant countries.
2
 
Finally, several studies do not find any significant and systematic impact of trade 
openness on income inequality (Edwards, 1997; Li et al., 1998). The next section reviews studies 
that focus on the relationship between conflict and income inequality. 
 
2.2. Conflict Risk and Income Inequality 
 
Most of the studies related to the link between conflict and income inequality have analysed the 
effect of income inequality on the conflict. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that horizontal 
inequality, defined as inequality between ethnic groups or regions, positively and significantly 
affects conflict (Ostby, 2008). Furthermore, in their econometric analysis of complex 
humanitarian emergencies (defined as human-made crises leading to physical violence, 
displacement, hunger and disease); Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) find that high income 
inequality is associated with emergencies.  
However, a number of authors find no significant correlation between income inequality 
and the likelihood of conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) develop an econometric model predicting the outbreak of civil conflict, and 
conclude that income inequality has no explanatory power on the risk of civil conflict. 
Recently, Bircan et al. (2010) analyse the potential relationship between conflict and 
income inequality in the other direction. They use a cross-country panel data to estimate war-
related changes in income disparities, and determine that violent conflict not only increases 
income inequality, but that it is further reinforced in the first post-conflict years. While this paper 
                                                          
2
 Fischer (2001) has also tested his theoretical 2x2 factor abundance model related to the dynamic effects of trade 
liberalization on income distribution and found that the outcomes of trade openness on inequality are based on 
whether the country is land-abundant or capital-abundant. 
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has many interesting results, it does not account for the interaction effect between trade openness 
and conflict in the analysis of the distributional impact of conflict on income inequality. 
 
2.3. Trade Openness and Conflict 
 
Several studies explicitly examine the link between conflict and trade openness (e.g., Oneal and 
Russet, 1999; Hegre et al., 2010), specifically asking whether conflicts influence the volume of 
goods and services traded in countries, or whether conflicts are the consequence of trade 
openness. Evidence on these two issues yields mixed results. A first series of papers finds that 
trade has important benefits by significantly reducing the likelihood of conflict between 
commercial partners (Oneal and Russett, 1999). While using a game-theoretic model of conflict 
to argue that trade prevents conflict because of the possible loss of trade gains, Morrow (1999) 
finds that the effect of trade flows on the initiation and escalation of international conflict is 
indeterminate. More recently, Hegre et al. (2010) adopt a simultaneous analysis to capture the 
reciprocal effects between trade and conflict, and show that trade promotes peace, while conflict 
reduces commerce. 
Nonetheless, other studies, following Oneal and Russett (1999), have argued that there is no 
significant correlation between trade openness and conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
 It follows from these literatures that no study has looked at the presence of conflict risk as 
a factor affecting the effect of trade openness on income inequality. To better understand the 
effect of trade openness on income inequality in developing countries, it makes sense to analyse 
whether the interaction effect between trade openness and conflict risk influences income 
inequality. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the interaction effect of 
trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality. By doing so, I deliver new insightful 
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results that allow to fill the gap in the literature on the distributional effect of trade openness on 
income inequality. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Model Specification 
 
Following Asiedu and Lien (2011), Michaud and Soest (2008), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),  
and Calderon and Chong (2001) who use similar dynamic panel data model, I estimate the 
Equation (1) in order to test whether the impact of trade openness on income inequality depends 
on the level of external conflict risk and internal conflict risk. 
 
'
0 1 1 2 3 4 5( * )it it it it it it it itEHII EHII TO C TO C X                 (1) 
where:  
it i it    , i and t represent the country and time period dummies, respectively; i  is the 
idiosyncratic individual and time invariant country effect and it  represents the usual error term. 
 
3.1.1. Dependent variable: estimated household income inequality (EHII) 
 
EHII is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 corresponding to complete equality and 100 
corresponding to complete inequality. It is drawn from the University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) database built by Galbraith and Kum (2003). They use the United Nations International 
Development Organization's (UNIDO) data source to compute the between-group component of 
the Theil's T-statistic as a measure of inequality and the corresponding database is called the 
UTIP-UNIDO data set. The EHII is then computed by combining the information provided by 
the Deininger and Squire (1996) data with the UTIP-UNIDO database. Even though the 
Deininger and Squire (1996) data are the standard reference for inequality studies, as argued by 
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Meschi and Vivarelli (2009), the coverage of their data is sparse and comes from different 
sources, leading to a variety of income and population definitions. Also, Atkinson and Brandolini 
(2001) point out that the differences in definitions may be quantitatively important and note that 
their preference calls for the alternative approach allowing for the use of data sets where the 
observations are as consistent as possible. Thus, the EHII, offering information that covers the 
period 1963-1999, has been constructed to account for serious data inconsistency and problems 
of comparability. In this paper, due to the availability of data for some variables, I restrict the 
sample to 39 developing countries during the period 1984-1999.
3
 
 
3.1.2. Independent variables 
 
TO, the trade openness variable measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), is used in this analysis, following Barro (2000). 
C refers to a vector of external conflict risk (EC) and internal conflict risk (IC).
4
 As 
described earlier, these two variables capture the risk of the incumbent government facing 
external and internal conflicts. For internal conflict risk, a maximum of four points and a 
minimum of 0 points are assigned to each subcomponent. The index of internal conflict risk is 
the sum of the scores of the three subcomponents, and ranges from 0 (very high risk of internal 
conflict) to 12 (very low risk of internal conflict), corresponding to countries where there is no 
armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary 
violence against its own people.  The external conflict risk also ranges from 0 to 12. The highest 
                                                          
3
 The choice of this period is motivated by the fact that the estimated household income inequality database ends in 
1999 and the data on internal and external conflict risks drawn from the ICRG database are available from 1984. 
4
 Gupta et al. (2009) use this index to account for the role of non-economic factors in financial development among 
low-income countries. Recently, internal and external conflicts have also been used by Asiedu and Lien (2011) in 
their paper analyzing the interaction effect of natural resources and democracy on foreign direct investments (FDI). 
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rating, corresponding to a very low risk of external conflict, is assigned to countries where there 
are no wars, cross-border conflicts, or foreign pressures. 
TO*C are the interaction terms between trade openness and external conflict risk 
(TO*EC) and internal conflict risk (TO*IC). 
X denotes a set of some control variables found in previous studies that can affect income 
inequality and includes: 
GDPpc, the Gross Domestic Product per capita, captures the stage of economic 
development. Data are drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World 
Bank, 2006). 
Inflation rate, defined as the annual percentage change in the consumption price index, is 
included to apprehend the fluctuations of economic activities, which are likely to affect income 
inequality. A number of papers find that higher inflation is associated with higher income 
inequality (Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Gourdon et al., 2008). 
Population aged 65 and above (% of total population) is incorporated into the model, 
following Deaton and Paxson (1997), to capture the age structure of the population. This variable 
may affect income inequality, since it is argued that a higher elderly population suggests lower 
productivity, lower savings rates, and smaller intergenerational transfer of income. 
Educational Attainment refers to gross enrollment of secondary education and is drawn 
from the Barro and Lee (2000) database. It measures the average number of years of secondary 
schooling and is included in the model to control for the effect of human capital on income 
inequality. A negative coefficient is anticipated. 
I also include Military in Politics in the model. It summarises the degree of military 
participation in politics, and is drawn from the PRS/ICRG database. It ranges from 0 (indicating 
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that the level of military participation in politics is higher, leading to a higher level of political 
risk) to 6 (indicating that the level of political risk is very low). It may affect income inequality 
because a predominant military presence in politics can increase the defense budget and reduce 
the level of allocations attributable to social programs. 
To check the robustness of the results, I use a set of variables such as institutions 
(corruption and democracy) and ethnic tensions that is drawn from the PRS/ICRG database, and 
a financial development variable proxied by liquid liabilities (M3) as a percentage of GDP, which 
is drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank (2006). 
Liquid liabilities, considered as the broadest measure of financial intermediation, are the sum of 
currency and deposits in the central bank (M0) plus deposits, demand and interest of non-bank 
financial intermediaries (M1 and M2). Natural resource abundance, which is the sum of ores, 
metal and fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports, is also included in the model. It is 
provided by the World Development Indicators (WDI) database, World Bank (2006).
5
 Table 1 
summarises descriptive statistics of the data used in this analysis.  
Now, to assess the marginal effect of trade openness on income inequality, the interactive 
model (Equation 1), which incorporates the interaction term, is used. This effect is computed by 
deriving the partial derivative of Equation 1 with respect to trade openness: 
2 4
it
it
it
EHII
C
TO
 

 

 
 
This equation tells us that the estimated impact on income inequality due to a change in 
trade openness amounts to the estimated coefficient of trade openness 2 , the product of the 
coefficient of the interaction between trade and conflict risk 4 , and the level of conflict risk. If 
                                                          
5
 For more detailed information about variables, see: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
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the effects of trade openness on income inequality are conditional to the level of conflict, the 
estimated coefficients 
2  and 4  must be of opposite signs and the threshold level should belong 
to the interval (0, 12). The same analysis can be done for the marginal effect of conflict risk on 
income inequality through the following expression: 
 
3 4
it
it
it
EHII
TO
C
 

 

 
3.2. Estimation Strategy 
 
In this section, I briefly describe the first estimation method used, namely, the bias-corrected 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDVC) estimation technique, based on Kiviet (1995), which 
is extended by Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bruno (2005). For simplicity, I rewrite the dynamic 
panel data model expressed in Equation 1 as follows: 
 
'
1it it it i ity y X        
Where ity is the dependent variable, itX  is a set of explanatory variables, i  is an unobserved 
individual effect, and it  is an unobserved white noise disturbance. 
The model can compactly be written as: 
y W D      with ( 1) |W y X     and 
' '( , )    and W is the matrix of explanatory 
variables and lagged dependent variable, D is the (NTxN) matrix of individual dummies,   is 
the (kx1) vector of coefficients,   is the (Nx1) vector of individual effects, and   is the (NTx1) 
vector of disturbances. The LSDV estimator of  , which is also often indicated as the fixed 
effect or the within-group estimator is: 
' 1 'ˆ ( )W AW W Ay   
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where A  is the within transformation matrix that gets rid of the individual effects. Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982) show that this estimator is not consistent for finite T  and for large number N , 
even though it has a relatively small variance. In Bun and Kiviet (2003), it is shown that the bias 
associated with the LSDV estimator is: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 3
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E c T c N T c N T O N T              
The bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) is obtained by using the two-step 
procedure suggested by Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005). The first step obtains estimates for the 
variance and the vector of coefficients. The second step performs bias correction by depuring
6
 
the LSDV estimator from the bias approximation, as can be seen in the following expression: 
ˆ
i iLSDVC B  , 1,2,3i   
The next section deals with issues of endogeneity. 
 
3.3. Endogeneity Issues 
 
Under the assumption of exogenous explanatory variables, the bias-corrected LSDV estimator is 
usually better than the GMM technique and most of other instrumental-variable estimators 
(Kiviet, 1995). Since the LSDVC estimator deals with the endogeneity of the lagged dependent 
variable in the dynamic specification but does not correct for the endogeneity of other 
explanatory variables, I control for endogeneity issues that can be driven by some regressors 
included in the model. It is well known that endogeneity likely arises as a result of measurement 
error, omitted variables, sample selection errors, and simultaneity problems. In this particular 
case, the endogeneity is engendered by the relation of reverse causality that may arise between 
income inequality and conflict risk. This allows the consideration of both internal and external 
                                                          
6
 For more detailed information about the bias approximations, see Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bruno (2005). 
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conflict risk, trade openness, and their interaction terms as endogenous variables. Previous 
studies on growth and income inequality suggest a reverse causality from income inequality to 
the GDP per capita variable. Moreover, the measurement error of the dependent variable does 
not lead to biased estimated coefficients when the error is not correlated with other explanatory 
variables. However, the measurement error in income inequality can be affected by some 
explanatory variables such as the level of educational attainment in developing countries. The 
estimation of the model specified in Equation 1 is likely to experience reverse causality 
problems. So, the only use of the bias-corrected LSDV estimator could lead to inconsistent 
estimated coefficients. 
Therefore, to address the likely endogeneity issues, I apply the consistent System 
Generalised Method of Moments (System-GMM) estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The use of instruments is required to deal with these endogeneity problems that may 
arise due to reverse causality between income inequality and conflict risk, because if the current 
level of inequality can be affected by current and past levels of conflict risk, at the same time, 
contemporaneous income inequality can also influence the current realization of conflict risk. 
However, it is less likely that the current level of income inequality affects the past realization of 
conflict risk. To this end, GMM estimator incorporates the regression equation in both changes 
and levels, each with its specific set of instruments, in a single system. Two tests are crucial for 
the consistency of the GMM estimator in order to show whether the lagged values of explanatory 
variables are valid instruments. The first test is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. 
This tests the hypothesis tested that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to a set of 
residuals. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the lagged variables used as instruments are 
acceptable and valid. The second test is the Arellano and Bond error autocorrelation test. The test 
17 
 
consists of examining the first and second-order serial correlations of the differenced error term 
(that is, the residual of the regression in differences). By construction, the first-order serial 
correlation of the disturbance term is expected. The hypothesis of the second-order serial 
correlation is that the differenced errors are not correlated. If the null hypothesis of the absence 
of autocorrelation of the error terms is not rejected, then the use of lagged variables as 
instruments is allowed. As argued by Asiedu and Lien (2011) and Roodman (2007), these two 
tests can lose power when the number of instruments, i, is higher than the number of countries, n; 
   . To solve for this problem, I follow Roodman (2007) who suggests reducing the instrument 
count by limiting the number of lags used as instruments. 
This GMM estimation technique has been widely used in the literature to solve for 
endogeneity issues related to reverse causality (Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Spilimbergo, 2009; Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2008; Djankov et al., 2008; Fajnzylber et al., 2002). For example, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) analyse the effects of aid on growth, and correct for the possible bias 
associated with the fact that poorer growth may draw aid contributions to recipient countries. In 
their analysis, they mention that the exclusion restriction underlying the use of lagged policy 
leads to the fact that trade reform has an important contemporaneous effect on growth, but 
absolutely no effect four years later. To assess the relationship between violent crime rates and 
income inequality, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) use this GMM technique to correct for the joint 
endogeneity problem, mentioning that the underlined relationship is often characterised by a 
two-way causality. Recently, Asiedu and Lien (2011) employ the GMM estimator to solve for 
the possibility of reverse causality between foreign direct investments (FDI) and democracy. 
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However, Windmeijer (2005) shows that, in small samples, estimated asymptotic 
standard errors of the two-step system-GMM estimator can be downward biased. As a robustness 
test, I provide robust standard errors by computing Windmeijer's finite-sample correction. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Effect of Trade Openness and Conflict Risks on Income Inequality 
 
Table 2 reports a series of regressions using the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected 
estimator (LSDVC) technique. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained after 200 iterations to 
test for the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. 
Column 1 shows the results of the basic model with the lagged dependent variable, the 
five control variables, the country, and year fixed effects. The results of the model when adding 
trade openness are shown in Column 2. Columns 3 and 4 display the results obtained by taking 
into account external conflict risk and its interaction with trade openness, respectively. The 
results displayed in Columns 5 and 6 concern the case of internal conflict risk and its interaction 
with trade openness. 
From all the regressions, the results indicate that the estimated coefficient associated with 
the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly statistically significant at 1%. This result is 
consistent with previous studies, suggesting that past income inequality appears to be a good 
predictor for current inequality (Calderon and Chong, 2001), and this gives support to the use of 
dynamic specification model of income inequality. 
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The results of Column 1 suggest that the coefficient related to inflation rate is positive 
and significant.
7
 This denotes that higher rates of inflation worsen income inequality. The 
estimates of Column 1 also point out that the coefficients associated with GDP per capita and 
educational attainment have the expected signs and the coefficient of population structure is 
positive, even though they do not reach the conventional level of significance. 
When the trade openness variable is added in Column 2, its coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that trade openness reduces income inequality. This gives 
support to the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction, arguing that greater openness helps to reduce income 
inequality in developing countries. The results of Column 2 also show that the coefficient 
estimate of the variable called military in politics, which measures the presence of militaries in a 
political sphere, is negative and statistically significant at 10%. This indicates that income 
inequality tends to be higher in countries with a large military presence in the political sphere. 
According to a theory of military dictatorships carried out by Acemoglu et al. (2010), when 
countries are supported by large militaries, they will find it difficult to consolidate democracy 
and will end up with military dictatorships, leading to worse economic performance because of 
conflict that may arise between citizens and soldiers. This large presence of militaries in politics 
may then induce an increase in income inequality, as a military regime poses the greatest risk 
and the system of governance will become corrupt and may create an armed opposition. 
In Column 3, external conflict risk is added to the model. It appears, from the additive 
model, that the coefficient associated with external conflict risk is not significant: the estimate of 
trade openness remains negative and significant, even though it falls slightly in the absolute term. 
The interaction term between external conflict risk and trade openness is introduced in 
Column 4. The results of the interactive model suggest that the coefficient of the trade openness 
                                                          
7
 This variable enters all the regressions with a positive and significant coefficient. 
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variable becomes positive and loses its significance. Moreover, the coefficient associated with 
external conflict risk remains positive and is significant. At the same time, the interaction term 
variable exhibits a negative coefficient and is statistically significant. This tends to support the 
hypothesis that the distributive impact of trade openness on income inequality depends on the 
level of external conflict risk; that is, trade openness increases income inequality in those 
countries where the risk of external conflict is very high, but reduces income inequality in 
countries where the risk is very low. More precisely, the estimates of Column 4 show that the 
positive effect of trade openness on income inequality is more pronounced in those countries 
where the risk of external conflict is higher. 
Columns 5 and 6 display the results of the models including, respectively, internal 
conflict risk and its interaction with trade openness. It appears that the coefficient of interaction 
term is negative and significant. This suggests, once again, the existence of the interaction effect 
between internal conflict risk and trade openness on income inequality. 
These empirical findings can be explained as follows: when the risks of internal and 
external conflicts are higher, the traditional mechanisms of transmission, by which exported and 
imported goods and services operate, work for a minority of well-informed and connected 
people, most of the time, who are very close to the regime in power. These people then enjoy an 
environment which profits them, but consequently excludes the large majority of the already 
vulnerable population. This leads to a reinforcement of income inequality among the 
populations. These results corroborate the findings of Barro (2000), who argued that the rich and 
politically connected will be most able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by global 
commerce, leading to the fact that increased trade would be most likely to raise inequality in 
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poor countries. In the next section, I deal with the endogeneity issues related to some of the 
explanatory variables included in this analysis. 
 
4.2. Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation Approach 
 
The LSDVC results presented in the previous sub-section are based on the assumption that all 
the explanatory variables, except the lagged dependent variable, are exogenously determined. In 
this section, I relax this assumption by tackling directly the endogeneity issues. 
The results obtained with the System-GMM dynamic panel data estimation are 
summarised in Table 3. First, it is important to notice that the test of second-order 
autocorrelation of Arellano and Bond AR(2) does not reject the hypothesis of the absence of 
autocorrelation of the error terms. Second, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions accepts 
the null hypothesis that all the lagged variables used as instruments are not correlated with the 
error terms, supporting the use of the lagged explanatory variables as instruments. 
Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients for the basic specification where neither the 
trade openness nor the conflict risk variables are included in the model specification. I find that 
the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable is higher than that obtained in the 
previous results with LSDVC, indicating that the positive effect of past levels of income 
inequality is more pronounced. The estimated coefficient of inflation rate remains positive and 
statistically significant. Educational attainment exhibits a negative coefficient but is not 
statistically different from zero. 
The results of the model including trade openness are presented in Column 2. Those of 
the additive model are displayed in Column 3. It appears that the estimated coefficient of trade 
openness not only increases in absolute term from its value shown in Column 2 of Table 2 and 
remains negative, but also becomes statistically significant. The results also show that the 
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external conflict risk coefficient increases sharply from its value in Column 3 of Table 2 but does 
not reach the conventional significance level. 
The outcomes of the interactive model (Column 4) are now discussed. The results show 
that the estimated coefficient of the trade openness variable becomes positive, and emerges even 
more significant. The coefficient of external conflict risk remains positive and becomes 
statistically different from zero. Another noteworthy feature is that the coefficient corresponding 
to the interaction term is negative and significant at 1%. Moreover, the inclusion of the 
interaction term causes the coefficient associated with the educational attainment variable to be 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an increase in human capital reduces 
income inequality. 
Columns 5 and 6 examine the links between income inequality and internal conflict risk 
and their interaction with trade openness. The estimated coefficient of the multiplicative variable 
is, once again, negative and statistically significant, even though the direct effects of trade 
openness and internal conflict risk on income inequality fail to reach the conventional 
significance level. This can be explained by the fact that, in the case of internal conflict risk, 
either the interaction effect is important enough that it neutralises the direct effects, or as argued 
earlier, internal conflict risk may have little impact on all the countries' economic activities, since 
it can be local. 
The implication of these findings, which goes along with popular assertion but 
contradicts standard trade theory, is that the worsening effect of trade openness on income 
inequality is accentuated in countries where the risks of external and internal conflicts are higher. 
It is important to highlight that the interactive model portrays conditional relationships, instead 
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of unconditional relationships suggested, until now, by the literature related to the political 
economy of trade openness. 
Overall, these results indicate that the interaction effect between trade openness and the 
risks of external and internal conflicts must be accounted for in the analysis of the distributional 
impacts of trade openness on income inequality. Conflict risks in a country may matter when 
assessing the relationship between trade openness and income inequality, since the gains from 
trade may not be equally distributed. 
 
4.3. Relationship between Conflict Risk and Income Inequality 
 
Up to this point, I have only tested the linear relationship between conflict risk and income 
inequality. In this section, I further investigate a non-linear relationship between conflict risk and 
income inequality. For this reason, I introduce the squared variables for both external and 
internal conflict risks. The results are summarised in Table 4. Column 1 reports the outcomes of 
the model, including the squared external conflict risk variable. The estimated coefficients 
suggest a non-monotonous relationship between external conflict risk and income inequality. The 
linear coefficient associated with external conflict risk is positive and significant, and the 
coefficient related to the squared external conflict risk variable is significantly negative, showing 
that income inequality increases at first and then decreases for large values of external conflict 
risk. 
Column 2 shows the results when internal conflict risk and its squared term are 
incorporated into the interactive model. I also find a non-monotonous relationship between 
internal conflict risk and income inequality. Since a greater value of conflict index corresponds 
to lower conflict risk, it is interesting for policy-makers to know that, after reaching a certain 
level of conflict index, any effort to reduce a conflict risk is associated with a decrease in income 
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inequality. The results also indicate that the coefficient estimate associated with the educational 
attainment variable is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, I find that the GDP per 
capita variable exhibits a positive and significant coefficient. This can be explained by the fact 
that during the early stage of economic development, income inequality increases over time. 
Overall, this non-monotonous relationship implies that income inequality worsens in 
countries that have a higher risk of conflict, a result consistent with Bircan et al. (2010), who 
argued that conflict may negatively affect, social spending and limit the government's ability to 
raise revenues necessary for public investment. 
 
5. Robustness Checks: Additional Control variables 
 
In this section, I further check the robustness of the results by using other explanatory variables 
that can affect income inequality. 
 
5.1. Institutional Quality 
 
I examine whether the main findings of this study are influenced by the inclusion of some 
institutional quality variables. Following Chong and Gradstein (2007), I use democracy and 
corruption to proxy for institutional quality. The two institutional variables used come from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. The indices of democracy and corruption 
range from 0 to 6. The highest rates of democracy and corruption indicate that the country is 
more democratic and less corrupt, respectively. 
The results of the models including the level of democracy and corruption perception are 
displayed, respectively, in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 for external conflict risk. The results are 
robust when controlling for those institutional variables, even though the estimated coefficients 
linked to democracy and corruption fail to be significant. However, their inclusion allows the 
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coefficient of the lagged dependent variable to be higher, denoting that the persistent 
characteristic of income inequality is much pronounced when controlling for the level of 
democracy and corruption. It is also worth mentioning that, with the model including the index 
of corruption, the coefficient related to educational attainment is negative and statistically 
significant. 
The same exercise is performed for internal conflict risk. The results are reported in 
Columns 4 and 5. I observe that the coefficient associated with democracy is negative and 
significant, suggesting that democratic regimes are more likely to reduce income inequality. 
 
5.2. Ethnic Tensions 
 
The literature suggests that fragmented societies are associated with poor policy management 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and that ethnically fragmented economies may find it difficult to 
agree on public goods and good policies (Easterly and Levine, 1997). As a robustness check, I 
include into the model the index of ethnic tensions which is an index that ranges from 0 to 6. It is 
drawn from the ICRG database as a proxy for ethnic diversity. 
The results, summarised in Columns 3 (for external conflict risk) and 6 (internal conflict 
risk) of Table 5, also appear to be robust to the inclusion of the ethnic tensions variable. Even 
more, in Column 6, the coefficient estimate associated with the ethnic tensions variable is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that more ethnically diverse countries are likely 
to experience greater income inequality. This result is in line with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) when they noted:  
‘Trade may be restricted to individuals of the same ethnic group; public infrastructure 
may have an ethnic bias; government expenditure may favor some ethnic groups, etc.’, 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, p. 796).  
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5.3. Financial Development 
 
Are the results still robust when I control for financial development proxied by liquid liabilities 
as a percentage of GDP? This question is investigated in Table 6. Column 1, reporting the results 
for external conflict risk, shows that the coefficient related to the interaction term is statistically 
significant in the presence of liquid liabilities, and the coefficient associated with the financial 
deepening variable is negative but not statistically different from zero. The same analysis is 
performed with internal conflict risk, and similar results are presented in Column 2. 
 
5.4. Natural Resource Abundance 
 
It is well-documented that countries that are highly dependent on the exportation of natural 
resources are likely to experience civil violence (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). To test for the 
effect of natural resource, I use variable called natural resource abundance. It is the sum of ores 
and metals exports and fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports. This variable is 
drawn from the World Development Indicator database (World Bank, 2006). The results, 
summarised in Table 7, do not change when this variable is incorporated into the model. The 
results associated with external conflict are reported in Column 1. It can be seen that the 
coefficients related to trade openness and external conflict risk are still positive and significant. 
Moreover, the coefficient linked to the interaction term is statistically negative. I run the same 
regression for internal conflict risk and report the results in Column 2. It appears that not only the 
interaction term coefficient is still negative and significant, but also that the coefficient related to 
the internal conflict risk variable is positive and becomes significant. However, the coefficient of 
the natural resource abundance variable is negative but not statistically significant. 
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5.5. Robustness to Regional Effects 
 
In this section, I check the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of regional effects. I include 
regional dummies for African countries, Latin American countries, and Asian countries in the 
models. I find that the results (not shown) are robust to the use of regional dummies variables. 
Interestingly, the statistical significance of the coefficients related to the interaction terms 
between external/internal conflicts risks and trade openness has increased even more. 
 
5.6. Additional Robustness Test 
 
In this section, since the two-step system-GMM estimator can yield downward biased standard 
errors in small samples, I run the same regressions displayed in Tables 3 and 4, and correct for 
the standard errors by computing the Windmeijer's finite-sample correction. The results with 
standard errors corrected by the Windmeijer's finite-sample correction method are reported in 
Tables 9 and 10. The correction method does not change the estimated coefficients, even though 
the statistical significance level decreases slightly for some coefficients. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have investigated the effect of trade openness on income inequality and how this effect is 
shaped by the presence of conflicts. Conflicts contract some activities and expand others. In 
general, war-vulnerable activities are often controlled by the poor, whereas activities that prosper 
during a war are controlled by the rich. To show the existence of the interaction effect between 
trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality, I use a panel of 39 developing countries 
and two estimation techniques - the bias-corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator 
(LSDVC) and the System GMM - to correct for endogeneity issues. I find that, once the 
interactive model is accounted for, trade openness increases income inequality, and this positive 
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relationship between trade openness and income inequality is even more exacerbated in states 
where the risk of conflict is higher. After controlling for a wide range of macroeconomic, 
demographic and institutional variables, this relationship appears to be clear empirical evidence 
that explains the differences in income inequalities across countries over time, and provides a 
new element to the debate. Whether the area is torn with conflict risk may matter when assessing 
the relationship between trade openness and income inequality. The results also suggest that past 
levels of income inequality are good predictors of current inequality.  
The evidence that trade openness reduces income inequality in countries with low risk of 
conflict is encouraging. It suggests that all policies aimed at preventing or reducing the risks of 
internal and external conflicts and supporting “peace” in developing countries, are not only more 
likely to directly decrease income inequality, but also may help trade openness to be more 
egalitarian, shedding light on the recurrent debate about whether or not developing countries 
must open their economies more to international trade. This study suggests that taking conflicts 
into account might reconcile the conflicting literature on the effect of trade openness on income 
inequality. 
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Table 1 
 Summary Statistics 
Notes: For definitions of variables and sources, see Table 8. 
 
 
 
 Full Sample Africa Latin America Asia 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
EHII 46.93 4.24 47.73 5.33 46.44 3.63 46.76 3.55 
Trade Openness 61.12 36.61 57.19 19.88 57.49 35.25 71.38 49.76 
External Conflict 9.26 2.42 8.98 2.45 9.56 2.31 9.10 2.52 
Internal Conflict 7.43 2.59 7.64 2.67 7.38 2.48 7.25 2.67 
GDP per capita 2170.45 2478.97 1016.43 1003.76 2881.55 1756.63 2399.45 3827.47 
Inflation Rate 105.63 745.56 21.45 32.45 225.93 1140.74 14.99 22.83 
Population Structure 4.18 1.92 3.13 0.59 5.35 2.37 3.57 0.86 
Military in Politics 3.26 1.60 3.42 1.51 3.29 1.63 3.01 1.65 
Educational Attainment 4.35 1.81 3.13 1.49 5.32 1.42 4.23 1.81 
Democracy Index 3.41 1.10 3.05 1.13 3.62 0.93 3.50 1.23 
Corruption Index 2.95 1.00 3.32 0.87 2.86 0.94 2.66 1.12 
Ethnic Tensions 3.62 1.59 3.19 1.20 4.68 1.31 2.48 1.33 
Liquid Liabilities 41.48 24.51 34.83 16.71 33.73 11.96 61.4 34.07 
Resource Abundance 23.97 26.72 29.39 33.14 23.48 23.95 20.73 25.09 
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Table 2 
 LSDVC Dynamic Estimation: Effect of Trade Openness, External and Internal Conflicts Risks on Income Inequality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EHII 0.596*** 
(10.77) 
0.588*** 
(10.67) 
0.589*** 
(10.73) 
0.579*** 
(10.75) 
0.584*** 
(10.73) 
0.572*** 
(10.46) 
Trade Openness  -0.0237** 
(-2.50) 
-0.0227** 
(-2.38) 
0.0138 
(0.58) 
-0.0246*** 
(-2.57) 
-0.0008 
(-0.06) 
External Conflict Risk   0.0254 
(0.35) 
0.292* 
(1.87) 
  
Internal Conflict Risk     -0.0685 
(-0.96) 
0.0996 
(0.90) 
Trade Openness*External Conflict    -0.00425* 
(-1.75) 
  
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict      -0.00297* 
(-1.79)   
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(2.72 
0.0004*** 
(2.75) 
0.0004*** 
(2.74) 
0.0004*** 
(2.82) 
0.0004*** 
(2.75) 
0.0004*** 
(2.90) 
Population Structure 0.0972 
(0.13) 
0.00619 
(0.01) 
0.0584 
(0.08) 
-0.528 
(-0.66) 
-0.0556 
(-0.07) 
-0.501 
(-0.61) 
Military in Politics -0.224 
(-1.59) 
-0.246* 
(-1.75) 
-0.256* 
(-1.76) 
-0.261* 
(-1.81) 
-0.170 
(-1.08) 
-0.201 
(-1.29) 
GDP per capita -0.00020 
(-0.48) 
-0.00023 
(-0.53) 
-0.00023 
(-0.54) 
-0.00006 
(-0.16) 
-0.00019 
(-0.45) 
-0.00002 
(-0.06) 
Educational Attainment -0.334 
(-1.19) 
-0.180 
(-0.65) 
-0.189 
(-0.69) 
-0.157 
(-0.58) 
-0.198 
(-0.72) 
-0.144 
(-0.52) 
Dummies :       
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimation method is the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) Dynamic Regression. 
 t statistics are below the coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 3 
 System-GMM Estimation: Effects of Trade Openness, External and Internal Conflicts Risks on Income Inequality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EHII 0.8096*** 
(5.28) 
0.7894*** 
(5.43) 
0.5476* 
(1.92) 
0.7498*** 
(5.63) 
0.6157*** 
(5.78) 
0.5726*** 
(5.27) 
Trade Openness  -0.0027   
(-0.26) 
-0.0219* 
(-1.89) 
0.0959*** 
(2.95) 
-0.0243** 
(-2.04) 
0.0183 
(1.09) 
External Conflict Risk   0.2590 
(1.40) 
0.8991*** 
(2.96)   
  
Internal Conflict Risk     -0.0162   
(-0.16) 
0.2067 
(1.22) 
Trade Openness*External Conflict    -0.0093*** 
(-2.85) 
  
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict      -0.0039* 
(-1.95) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(6.80) 
0.0004*** 
(6.83) 
0.0004*** 
(3.46) 
0.0004*** 
(5.46) 
0.0004*** 
(6.17)   
0.0004*** 
(5.78) 
Population Structure 0.0666 
(0.61) 
0.0153 
(0.11) 
-0.0330 
(-0.13) 
0.0187 
(0.11) 
-0.2900 
(-1.57) 
-0.1868 
(-0.70)    
Military in Politics -0.0392 
(-0.39) 
-0.0679 
(-0.70) 
0.0663 
(0.34)       
-0.1412 
(-1.34)   
-0.1235 
  (-0.66)       
-0.0881 
(-0.36) 
GDP per capita -8.97e-06 
(-0.05) 
-0.00003 
(-0.61) 
-0.00006 
(-0.14) 
0.00008 
(0.70) 
0.0002 
(1.23)   
0.0002 
(0.55)   
Educational Attainment -0.3675 
(-1.24)          
-0.2403 
(-0.86)    
-0.6062 
  (-0.75)             
-0.5960* 
(-1.86)      
-0.1306 
  (-0.40)   
-0.2588      
(-0.62)   
Constant 11.0109 
(1.31) 
11.8353 
(1.46)    
23.8853 
(1.41)       
6.1928 
(0.77) 
21.7476*** 
(3.47)   
21.6420*** 
(3.31)   
Hansen Test of overidentying 
(p-value) 
9.30 
(0.677) 
8.67 
(0.653) 
7.53 
(0.821) 
5.75 
(0.764) 
3.60 
(0.990) 
4.48 
(0.973) 
AR(1) 0.046 0.044 0.059 0.035 0.029 0.025 
AR(2) 0.276 0.279 0.351 0.289 0.298 0.288 
Number of observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step. System-GMM estimator. t-statistics are below the coefficients. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as 
trade openness, conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation rate, population structure 
and military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4 
 System-GMM Estimation: Non-Monotonous Relationship between Conflicts Risks and Income 
Inequality 
Variable (1) (2) 
Lagged EHII 0.738*** 
(8.76) 
0.580*** 
(5.66) 
External Conflict Risk 1.291*** 
(3.13) 
 
External Conflict Risk Squared -0.0580*** 
(-2.63) 
 
 
Trade Openness*External Conflict -0.00624** 
(-2.48) 
 
Internal Conflict Risk  1.514*** 
(2.92) 
Internal Conflict Risk Squared  -0.0863*** 
(-2.57) 
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict  -0.00136 
(-0.50) 
Trade Openness 0.0543** 
(2.05) 
0.00399 
(0.16) 
GDP per capita 0.00006 
(0.53) 
0.00043* 
(1.97) 
Population Structure -0.0759 
(-0.43) 
-0.111 
(-0.45) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(5.81) 
0.0005*** 
(6.03) 
Educational Attainment -0.283 
(-1.05) 
-0.737** 
(-2.14) 
Military in Politics -0.0520 
(-0.51) 
-0.272 
(-1.35) 
Constant 7.737 
(1.35) 
18.60*** 
(3.24) 
Hansen Test of overidentying 
(p-value) 
5.29 
(0.916) 
9.09 
(0.766) 
AR(1) 0.037 0.029 
AR(2) 0.263 0.258 
Number of observations 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step System-GMM estimator. 
t-statistics are below the coefficients. AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second 
autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as trade openness, 
conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation 
rate, population structure and military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5 
 System-GMM Estimation: Robustness of the Results to the Inclusion of Institutional Quality and Ethnic Tensions 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EHII 0.8235*** 
(5.36) 
0.8326*** 
(7.84) 
0.6985*** 
(4.20) 
0.6266*** 
(3.86) 
0.6249*** 
(4.29) 
0.5533*** 
(2.97) 
Trade Openness 0.0876* 
(1.84) 
0.0853** 
(2.25) 
0.0998*** 
(2.93) 
0.0123 
(0.85) 
0.0169 
(0.91) 
0.0162 
(1.07) 
External Conflict Risk 0.8114** 
(2.07) 
0.7509*** 
(2.62) 
0.8565*** 
(2.90) 
   
Internal Conflict Risk    0.1739 
(1.16) 
0.2235 
(1.00) 
0.1460 
(0.93) 
Trade Openness*External Conflict -0.0083** 
(-2.11) 
-0.0079** 
(-2.25) 
-0.0098*** 
(-3.85) 
   
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict    -0.0038** 
(-2.17) 
-0.0036* 
(-1.80) 
-0.0033** 
(-1.96) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(5.26) 
0.0004*** 
(7.19) 
0.0004*** 
(6.91) 
0.0004*** 
(8.17) 
0.0004*** 
(5.45) 
0.0004*** 
(6.47) 
Population Structure 0.0344 
(0.45) 
0.0633 
(0.36) 
0.0802 
(0.19) 
-0.1169 
(-0.73) 
-0.2091 
(-0.88) 
-0.0980 
(-0.51) 
Military in Politics -0.1052 
(-0.51) 
-0.0641 
(-0.36) 
-0.0735 
(-0.51) 
0.0652 
(0.23) 
-0.0502 
(-0.12) 
0.0006 
(0.00) 
GDP per capita 0.00007 
(0.41) 
0.00002 
(0.21) 
0.00008 
(0.46) 
0.00001 
(0.03) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
0.00008 
(0.15) 
Educational Attainment -0.2403 
(-0.84) 
-0.5260* 
(-1.88) 
-0.4916 
(-1.22) 
-0.1317 
(-0.36) 
-0.1432 
(-0.33) 
-0.2353 
(-0.47) 
Democracy Index -0.1295 
(-0.43) 
  -0.3132* 
(-1.92) 
  
Corruption Index  -0.0574 
(-0.19) 
  -0.0894 
(-0.25) 
 
Ethnic Tensions   -0.2472* 
(-1.90) 
  -0.1556 
(-0.73) 
Hansen Test of overidentying 
(p-value) 
11.68 
(0.554) 
5.82 
(0.758) 
4.84 
(0.963) 
4.25 
(0.994) 
5.40 
(0.979) 
4.59 
(0.970) 
AR(1) 0.041 0.038 0.047 0.036 0.027 0.039 
AR(2) 0.296 0.280 0.293 0.295 0.287 0.296 
Number of observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step System-GMM estimator. t-statistics are below the coefficients. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as trade 
openness, conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation rate, population structure and 
military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6 
System-GMM Estimation: Robustness of the Results to the Inclusion of Financial Development 
Variable (1) (2) 
Lagged EHII 0.719*** 
(4.59) 
0.536* 
(1.88) 
External Conflict Risk 0.863*** 
(2.57) 
 
 
Trade Openness*External Conflict -0.0092** 
(-2.50) 
 
Internal Conflict Risk  0.333 
(1.30) 
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict  -0.0037** 
(-2.15) 
Trade Openness 0.0977** 
(2.20) 
0.0211 
(0.99) 
GDP per capita 0.00015 
(0.82) 
0.00014 
(0.37) 
Population Structure -0.0403 
(-0.24) 
-0.0213 
(-0.09) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(6.23) 
0.0004*** 
(4.39) 
Educational Attainment -0.554* 
(-1.77) 
-0.628 
(-1.03) 
Military in Politics -0.168 
(-1.01) 
-0.167 
(-0.49) 
Liquid Liabilities -0.0125 
(-0.89) 
-0.0055 
(-0.24) 
Hansen Test of overidentying 
(p-value) 
5.17 
0.819 
7.68 
0.809 
AR(1) 0.034 0.032 
AR(2) 0.281 0.275 
Number of observations 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step System-GMM estimator. 
t-statistics are below the coefficients. AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second 
autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as trade openness, 
conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation 
rate, population structure and military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7 
 System-GMM Estimation: Robustness of the Results to Natural Resource Abundance 
Variable (1) (2) 
Lagged EHII 0.8020*** 
(11.55) 
0.7447*** 
(6.05) 
External Conflict Risk 0.8693*** 
(2.79) 
 
Trade Openness*External Conflict -0.0086*** 
(-2.72) 
 
Trade Openness 0.0846*** 
(2.57) 
0.0195 
(1.34) 
GDP per capita 0.00005 
(0.32) 
0.00005 
(0.54) 
Population Structure -0.0979 
(-0.45) 
-0.0402 
(-0.22) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(6.69) 
0.0004*** 
(6.68) 
Educational Attainment -0.3843* 
(-1.69) 
-0.4630* 
(-1.90) 
Military in Politics -0.1035 
(-0.71) 
-0.2830* 
(-1.73) 
Natural Resource Abundance -0.0211 
(-0.75) 
-0.0247 
(-1.28) 
Internal Conflict Risk  0.4364*** 
(2.91) 
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict  -0.0031* 
(-1.84) 
Hansen Test of overidentying 
(p-value) 
4.23 
0.937 
5.34 
0.868 
AR(1) 0.007 0.023 
AR(2) 0.936 0.963 
Number of observations 348 348 
Number of countries 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step System-GMM estimator. 
t-statistics are below the coefficients. AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second 
autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as trade openness, 
conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation 
rate, population structure and military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 
 Definitions of Variables and Sources of Data 
Variable Definition and sources 
EHII Estimated Household Income Inequality. It ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 corresponding 
to complete equality and 100 corresponding to complete inequality; provided by the 
Wage University of Texas Income Project (WUTIP). 
Trade Openness, TO Ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP (%). From World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2006) of the World Bank. 
External Conflict, EC Index of external conflict risk. It is composed of war, cross-border conflict and foreign 
pressures. It ranges from 0 to 12 with 0 corresponding to very high risk of external 
conflict and 12 to very low risk. From the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
database. 
Internal Conflict, IC Index of internal conflict risk. It is composed of civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political 
violence and civil disorder. It ranges from 0 to 12 with 0 corresponding to very high risk 
of internal conflict and 12 to very low risk, from the ICRG database. 
Trade Openness*External Conflict, TOEC Interaction term between trade openness and external conflict risk. 
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict, TOIC Interaction term between trade openness and internal conflict risk. 
Educational Attainment, EA Educational attainment of the total population aged 25 and over, from Barro and Lee 
(2004). 
GDP per capita, GDPpc Gross Domestic Product per capita (constant 2000 US). From WDI (2006), World Bank. 
Inflation Rate, INFL Consumer prices (annual %). From WDI (2006), World Bank. 
Population Structure, POP Population ages 65 and above (% of total) . From WDI (2006), World Bank. 
Military in Politics, Milpol Index of military in politics. It ranges from 0 to 6. From the ICRG database. 
Democracy, Democ Index of democracy, It ranges from 0 to 6. The value 0 is assigned to autarchies and 6 is 
assigned to alternating democracies. From the ICRG database. 
Corruption, Corrup Index of corruption. It ranges from 0 to 6 with 0 corresponding to more corrupt countries 
and 6 to less corrupt countries. From the ICRG database. 
Ethnic Tensions, ET Index of ethnic tensions, It ranges from 0 to 6. The value 0 corresponds to countries with 
high racial and nationality tensions and 6 to low racial and nationality tensions. From the 
ICRG database. 
Liquid Liabilities, LL Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP. From WDI (2006), World Bank. 
Natural Resources Abundance, Res  Natural Resources abundance (exports of ores and metals) as % of total exports. From 
WDI (2006), World Bank. 
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Table 9 
System-GMM Estimation with Windmeijer Finite Sample Correction: Trade Openness, External and Internal Conflicts Risks, and 
Income Inequality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EHII 0.8096*** 
(2.92) 
0.7894*** 
(3.04) 
0.5493* 
(1.82) 
0.7498*** 
(4.26) 
0.6157*** 
(4.89) 
0.5726*** 
(3.28) 
Trade Openness  -0.0027 
(-0.17) 
-0.0181* 
(-1.83) 
0.0959*** 
(3.01) 
-0.0243* 
(-1.81) 
0.0183 
(1.09) 
External Conflict Risk   0.2145* 
(1.75) 
0.8991*** 
(3.04) 
  
Internal Conflict Risk     -0.0162 
(-0.13) 
0.2067 
(0.97) 
Trade Openness*External Conflict    -0.0093 
(-3.04) 
  
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict      -0.0039* 
(-1.86) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(5.80) 
0.0004*** 
(6.89) 
0.0004*** 
(3.75) 
0.0004*** 
(5.40) 
0.0004*** 
(6.42) 
0.0004*** 
(6.50) 
Population Structure 0.0666 
(0.43) 
0.0153 
(0.07) 
0.0635 
(0.30) 
0.0187 
(0.10) 
-0.2900 
(-1.49) 
-0.1868 
(-0.77) 
Military in Politics -0.0392 
(-0.25) 
-0.0679 
(-0.45) 
0.1391 
(0.83) 
-0.1412 
(-1.13) 
-0.1235 
(-0.55) 
-0.0881 
(-0.23) 
GDP per capita -8.97e-06 
(-0.05) 
-0.00003 
(-0.20) 
-0.0002 
(-0.88) 
0.00008 
(0.64) 
0.0002 
(0.79) 
0.0002 
(0.31) 
Educational Attainment -0.3675 
(-0.80) 
-0.2403 
(-0.84) 
-0.6842 
(-0.91) 
-0.5960 
(-1.52) 
-0.1306 
(-0.38) 
-0.2588 
(-0.51) 
Hansen Test of overidentying 
(p-value) 
9.30 
(0.677) 
8.67 
(0.653) 
5.16 
(0.923) 
5.75 
(0.764) 
3.60 
(0.990) 
4.48 
(0.973) 
AR(1) 0.064 0.059 0.059 0.039 0.031 0.033 
AR(2) 0.283 0.285 0.332 0.290 0.299 0.292 
Number of observations 422 407 407 407 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step System-GMM estimator. t-statistics are below the coefficients. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as trade 
openness, conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation rate, population structure 
and military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 10 
 System-GMM Estimation with Windmeijer Finite Sample Correction: Non-Monotonous 
Relationship between Conflicts Risks and Income Inequality 
Variable (1) (2) 
Lagged EHII 0.738*** 
(6.31) 
0.580** 
(2.56) 
External Conflict Risk 1.291*** 
(2.88) 
 
External Conflict Risk Squared -0.0580** 
(-2.30) 
 
Trade Openness*External Conflict -0.00624** 
(-2.32) 
 
Internal Conflict Risk  1.514** 
(2.19) 
Internal Conflict Risk Squared  -0.0863** 
(-1.99) 
Trade Openness*Internal Conflict  -0.00136 
(-0.35) 
Trade Openness 0.0543* 
(1.86) 
0.00399 
(0.11) 
GDP per capita 0.00006 
(0.55) 
0.00043 
(1.44) 
Population Structure -0.0759 
(-0.39) 
-0.111 
(-0.34) 
Inflation Rate 0.0004*** 
(5.07) 
0.0005*** 
(5.33) 
Educational Attainment -0.283 
(-0.92) 
-0.737 
(-1.25) 
Military in Politics -0.0520 
(-0.40) 
-0.272 
(-0.95) 
Constant 7.737 
(1.05) 
18.60 
(1.49) 
Hansen Test of Overidentying 
(p-value) 
5.29 
(0.916) 
9.09 
(0.766) 
AR(1) 0.039 0.047   
AR(2) 0.264 0.268 
Number of observations 407 407 
Number of countries 39 39 
Notes: For definitions and sources of data, see Table 8. The estimated method is a two-step System-GMM estimator. 
t-statistics are below the coefficients. AR(1) and AR(2) are respectively Arellano-Bond first and second 
autocorrelation tests. Time dummy variables are included in all regressions. Variables such as trade openness, 
conflict risks, GDP per capita and education are instrumented, using their own lags in level and differences. Inflation 
rate, population structure and military in politics are treated as exogenous. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 11 
List of Countries Included in the Analysis 
 
 
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Kuwait, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay, Bangladesh, India,  Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, 
Turkey. 
 
 
